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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 
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This paper aims to trace the history of central banking in pre-WWII Greece. To this 
end, we first study the country’s financial structure and its process of financial 
development.  Several indices of financial development have been assessed and their 
evolvement has been studied. The country’s financial development had passed 
through different stages. Financial depth had increased in the turn of the 19
th century 
and expanded further in the 1920s. However, on the basis of behavioural indices, 
banks were shown to be poorly asset-liability managed. They were also suffered by 
capital adequacy and were highly leveraged. The analysis of the composition of 
money supply and its long run behaviour suggests that monetary base variations were 
the proximate determinants of money supply movements, whereas money multiplier 
had a minimum impact. Central banking in pre-WWII Greece is viewed with regard to 
the monetary policy strategy, the monetary policy implementation framework and 
state interventions. The balance sheet of the Bank of Greece reveals an excessive 
focus on the chosen monetary policy strategy of a currency peg. Domestic credit was 
controlled  via  liquidity-providing standing facilities, either discounts or advances. 
Moreover, Bank’s considerable involvement in government re-financing might 
indicate that state interventions were considerable.    
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1. Introduction 
According to the textbook view of the theory of central banking, ‘a central 
bank can generally be defined as a financial institution responsible for overseeing the 
monetary system for a nation, or a group of nations, with the goal of fostering 
economic growth without inflation’ (Casu et al. 2006, p.110). The core policy 
functions of a central bank is to control the note and coin issue; to administer the 
money supply of the economy; to supervise and regulate commercial banking so as to 
keep financial stability; to act as a lender of last resort in order to protect depositors 
and prevent banks’ failure by granting credit to those banks being in serious liquidity 
difficulties and eventually protect the economy by preventing potential financial 
panics; to act as the government’s banker and the official agent to the government in 
dealing with gold and foreign matters (Capie et al. 1994).
1  
  Historically speaking, in the gold standard era central banks acted as the 
guardians of the gold standard, currency managers and providers of war finance. 
Usually, they were commercial banks to which the government had granted the 
monopoly of issue, while they were not independent from state intervention and 
commercial considerations. Laissez-faire rules secured monetary and financial 
stability. In the interwar years, however, the new orthodoxy of monetary policy 
implementation concerned the founding of ‘real’ central banks in each country, in 
order to effectively use monetary policy tools to protect economies from the heavy 
monetary and financial disorders followed the aftermath of the war. Near to this 
international movement, Greece created its own central bank in 1928 with a prime 
objective of safeguarding the international price of the domestic currency and keeping 
inflation at a low level.   
  This paper aims, for the first time, to trace the historical evolution of central 
banking in pre-WWII Greece. To this end, we study the country’s financial structure 
and its process of financial development. In particular, we analyze the composition of 
the money supply in the domestic economy and its long run behaviour. Central 
                                                 
1 Nowadays, the merits and demerits of central banks are yet a question under debate. ‘Free-banking 
school’ theorists object the need for a central bank and argue that regulation should be left to the 
market (Dowd 1996).  On the other hand, in Goodhart’s view (1989) central banks are needed for two 
reasons. First, banks operate the payment systems and undertake portfolio management services and 
hence, they need to be preserved and, second, a central bank aims to prevent the collapse of the 
banking sector arising from information problems, excessive risk taking and abuses by bankers.    8
banking is viewed with regard to the monetary policy strategy, the monetary policy 
implementation framework and independence from political influence.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the development 
over time of selected macroeconomic indicators. Section 3 considers the country’s 
financial surrounding. Specifically, several measures of the degree of financial 
development have been assessed and their trend behaviour has been studied. In 
Section 4 banks’ behavioural indicators are discussed in an attempt to evaluate the 
soundness of the domestic banking system. Section 5 studies the composition of the 
money supply in the economy (that is, bank deposits and banknotes) and presents the 
determinant factors of the money supply movements. Section 6 deals with the 
country’s central banking. It discusses its origin and its crucial monetary policy 
functions. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Macroeconomic Indicators 
Economic and monetary conditions in pre-WWII Greece were largely determined 
by the interplay between fiscal imbalances and monetary disturbances. Greece had a 
weak governmental financial system due not only to wartime emergencies but also to 
spendthrift governments and their inability to undertake a radical budget reform. As a 
result, the country suffered by frequent convertibility and confidence crises. However, 
the episodes of inconvertibility were interrupted by short periods of monetary stability 
and rapid economic growth. In the course of a 100-year period, the country 
experienced important demographic and territorial changes which raised consumption 
and aggregate demand but also threw a burden on the government budget. Sudden 
population increases were due to the country’s territorial enlargements which were the 
outcome of its involvement in frequent hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, the 
Balkan Wars and WWI.  
Table 1 presents the development over time of selected macroeconomic indicators. 
As seen, the first improvement of the domestic economy can be dated to after the 
middle of the 19
th century. In the 1850s the average growth rate of real GDP was 
positive and high, even though excess volatile. Positive but lower rates prevailed in 
the next two decades. In the 1880s, the rate of growth rose sharply due to private 
investment inflows. It was the period of the country’s economic restructure and   9
development. From the turn of the century afterwards output growth accelerated. The 
country enjoyed steadily high and less volatile output growth rates. Despite the 
significant increase in the size of the population owning to the gradual territorial 
enlargement of the country, the level of real per capita income exhibits a strong 
upward trend, mainly as the result of the increase in output.  
 
 





Real GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
Real Per Capita Income 
(in LMU drs.) 
1840s  1.00*  -0.48**  (-15.77)***  180.7** 
1850s 1.08  3.89  (3.42)  207.5 
1860s  1.44  2.04  (2.94)  219.0 
1870s  1.68  1.88  (3.96)  208.3 
1880s 2.19  4.12  (1.61)  246.1 
1890s 2.49  0.49  (26.35)  231.2 
1900s 2.67  2.33  (4.00)  256.6 
1910s 4.81  4.19  (0.97)  265.8 
1920s 6.31  4.72  (1.91)  263.4 
1930s 7.12  3.96  (1.46)  326.5 
Notes: annual data, real GDP and real per capita GDP at 1914 constant prices.  
(*) end-of-period data. Important territorial enlargements followed by population increases occurred in 
1881, 1913 and 1922-23.   
(**) averages of the annual observations over selected dates.  
(***) coefficient of variation; it measures the standard deviation to the series’ mean. 
Sources: The data for the level of real GDP and real per capita GDP are from Kostelenos et al. (2007). 
The data for the population are from the National Statistical Service of Greece, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin (various issues).  
 
 
During the gold standard period 1870-1913, Greece enjoyed an average annual per 
capita GDP growth rate of 1.4%, which lagged only 0.1 of a percentage point behind 
the combined rate of the most advanced countries (namely, the US, the UK, France 
and Germany).
2 In the interwar years (1918-1938) the difference was notably higher, 
2.6% compared with 1.2%. The interwar period was marked by a de-globalisation 
since extensive controls had been imposed worldwide upon goods and money flows. 
                                                 
2 Based on Maddison’s (2003) estimates for Greece. However, according to more recent estimates 
(Kostelenos et al. 2007), the rolling (over a 5 year time span) average annual per capita income growth 
rate was lower (0.66%), which was 0.85 of a pp less the combined average of the most advanced 
countries. This favourable performance of the country is easily explained by the convergence 
hypothesis: a poor country, ceteris paribus, tends to grow faster than a rich country and hence the per 
capita income level of the former will catch up with the latter (see, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, 
2003).    10
Trade and mainly agricultural exports were reduced. A peripheral economy, like 
Greece of the time, should speed up the industrialization process in order to continue 
enjoying positive growth rates. Indeed, the 1920s were a period of rapid growth 
regarding the Greek industry. The heavy tariff protection and the sharp fall in real 
wages
3 were the driving forces of this developing process. From 1921 to 1927 the 
volume of industrial production increased by 7.2% yearly.
4   
However, Greece was part of the group of the less developed countries in Europe. 
As seen in Figure 1, throughout the whole sample period, Greek per capita income 
was less than half of the combined average of the most advanced economies. In 1870 
per capita income corresponded to a mere 39%, relative to the G-4 average (G-4=100, 
in international US dollars). In the 1900s it was in the vicinity of 45-48%, reaching a 
peak of 56% and 52% in 1911 and 1912, respectively. However, the distance from the 
advanced economies rapidly increased to 31% in 1913 and 36% in 1923. This 
unfavorable development was mainly due to important demographic changes across 
these dates. In the 1930s, the distance became shorter; at the ending date of our 
sample period per capita income corresponded to 46%. Figure 2 also compares the 
output performance among some Balkan countries, G-4 and a European average. 
Compared with the 1870 picture, in 1913 Greece continued to be among the poorest 
European countries; only Portugal and Serbia were left behind.
5  
 
3. Financial Intermediation: Stylized Facts 
We next consider the country’s financial surrounding which is our main 
concern. Several measures of the degree of financial development have been proposed 
in the literature (see, for example, Beck et al. 1999, Beck and Levine 2004, Bordo and 
Rousseau 2006). The most widely used are: (i) the ratio of bank assets to GDP; it 
illustrates the importance of the financial services provided by banks relative to the 
                                                 
3 Due both to the existence of an abundant labour force after the massive influx of refugees in 1922-23 
(among whom there was a large part of industrial workers) and the high inflation rates. Consumer price 
inflation was 22.5% in 1915; it then climbed to 33.3% in 1918, reaching a peak of 66.4% in 1922. 
Inflation fell at moderate levels in 1924-26 and was eventually stabilized in 1928 at a level close to 1%. 
After averting the deflation waves of 1929 crash, prices began to rise again. From 1932 to 1939 the 
average annual inflation rate was 4.2%.  
4 Industry firms were labour oriented and in their majority produced consumer goods mainly for 
domestic consumption.  
5 For a comparison in a historical perspective of the output performance among the European countries, 
see Morys (2006).   11
size of the economy.  (ii) The level of bank credit to the private sector as a share of 
GDP; it shows the importance of one of the main functions of financial 
intermediaries, namely channeling savings to investors. (iii) The ratio of private 
deposits to GDP; it reflects public confidence in the banking system, and (iv) broad 
money divided by GDP. The last two indices primarily reflect the size of a country’s 
banking system. They will record high values for countries with more bank-based 
financial systems. Or, as a country’s economy gradually relies more heavily on the 
banking activity than in the past, the ratio of deposits and money will exhibit a strong 










































Notes: in international 1990 US dollars. G-4 is the average of the annual levels of real per capita 
income of the UK, the US, France and Germany.  
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Figure 3 depicts the development over time of the degree of financial depth 
measured by the above mentioned indices.
6 As seen, financial depth exhibits a 
positive long run trend, even though it is relatively weak and excess volatile. The rate 
of increase was rather slow in the first quarter of the time span; it then accelerated and 
reached its peak in the eve of the outbreak of WWI. However, during wartime and its 


















Notes: real per capita income in international 1990 US $. Europe-18: Belgium, France, Germany, the 
UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Hungary, Romania and Serbia.  





The recent literature on economic development and finance supports that a long 
run linkage exists between economic growth and financial development (see Bruno 
and Easterly 1998, Gylfason and Herbertsson 2001, Boyd et al. 2001). As per capita 
income rises, financial depth increases since the demand for money becomes higher. 
Thereby, by providing the economic system with the necessary liquidity, banking 
system accommodates economic growth.  
                                                 
6 Computations are based on year averages using a five year rolling span. They remain unchanged 
when we use a longer (ten year) rolling time span. Using a rolling time span it helps us to minimize the 












































Notes: The data series are year averages using a five year rolling time span and are defined as per cent 
to GDP. End-of-year data.  Deposits= total private deposits (sight, time, savings and bank bonds) 
denominated in specie, foreign exchange and drachmas. They refer mainly to deposits with the 
National Bank of Greece (NBG) till 1911 and with all other banks and the NBG from 1912 afterwards. 
The sample covers 15 banks and the NBG for the period 1912-1926, 43 banks and the NBG in 1927 
and 38 banks and the NBG for the period 1928-1939. Loans= total gross loans to firms and households, 
8 large banks (namely, NBG 1842-1939; Emporiki Bank 1908-1932; Agricultural Bank of Greece 
1930-1939; Bank of Athens 1896-1939;  Anatolis Bank 1905-1925; Bank of Crete 1899-1917; Epirus-
Thessaly Bank 1882-1896). Assets= based on the sample of 8 large banks. Money= defined as broad 
money, i.e., the sum of total private deposits and banknotes in circulation outside the banking system.  
Sources: The data series for total assets and private loans are taken directly from the banks’ Balance 
Sheets (various issues); the data for money and deposits are from worksheets underlying Lazaretou 




By plotting in Figure 4 private lending and real per capita income, we can look 
at the linkages among them. The pattern is pretty clear. Per capita income and private 
lending go hand in hand in the data. The correlation coefficient is positive and high 
enough (0.6), implying that banking credit expands with rising per capita income. It 
seems that this association holds in almost every date of our long time span, even 
though the country had passed through different stages of the economic and financial 











































Financial Intermediation and Per Capita Income, 1846-1939
 
 
Notes: A locally weighted second degree polynomial regression is fitted for each data point in the 
sample. Financial intermediation is defined as the ratio of private credit to GDP; per capita income is at 
constant 1914 prices and in LMU drachmas. The data series are annual averages based on a 5 year 
rolling time span.  
Sources: banks’ Balance Sheets and Kostelenos et al. (2007). 
 
 
However, two cases are worthy of mention. First, the correlation coefficient 
becomes higher (0.9) for those dates which combine a high per capita income with a 
high ratio of private lending. From the turn of the 19
th century till the outbreak of 
WWI, strong economic growth was reflected into high per capita income. Bank loans 
expanded to accommodate the increase in output demand. As lending expands, more 
banks entered the market to exploit profits since there were no entry barriers. Second, 
after averting the world-wide crisis of 1929, relatively low rates of bank lending were 
associated with high per capita income (see the cluster of observations in the north-
west corner of the figure). The correlation is reduced to 0.4, indicating that other 
forces might motivate economic growth. During that period, large public   15
infrastructure works were implemented that stimulated domestic production. On the 
financial sphere, the Greek version of the world-wide financial crisis of 1929 was 
mirrored to several bank dissolutions and bankrupts. To restore public confidence in 
the banking system, an institutional set up was established in 1931, concerning the 
function and supervision of the country’s credit institutions. However, as it is widely 
known, institutions change only gradually and slowly and their effects on the 
economic conditions take time before they can be noticed.  
 
4. The Country’s Financial Structure (I): Banks’ Behavioural 
Indicators  
Key features of every developing country are: few money transactions, low 
demand for money, savings shortage and low public confidence in banking. In the 
very early years of the modern Greek state, the demand for credit was satisfied by 
merchants and small private bankers. Their main activities were currency exchange, 
money deposits and short-term lending with collateral. The country’s financial system 
made its start with the inception of the National Bank of Greece (NBG) in 1842. It 
was created and functioned as a ‘universal bank’, that is a deposit and a discount bank 
as well as a provider of short- and long-term private credit. At the same time it was 
granted by the government the monopoly of note issue. Soon, it became the biggest in 
resources and exerted its dominance over the domestic money market.   
Throughout the 19
th century, the process of financial intermediation went at a slow 
pace. Many banks were created but very few eventually functioned. In principle, they 
were short-lived with limited and locally located activities. Soon after their owner’s 
and manager’s death or retirement, they were becoming dissolved. Till 1900, only 4 
out of 23 credit institutions remained active.  
In the eve of the 20
th century financial intermediation process went at a quick 
pace. The change in the stance of the economic policy pursued towards fiscal 
consolidation and monetary prudence followed the country’s external debt 
compromise in 1898, largely contributed to the restoration of public confidence in the 
domestic currency. As a result, significant private investment capital inflows occurred 
which combined with high money inflows from trade, shipping and emigrants’ 
remittances. The high rate of economic activity increased money transactions and the   16
demand for money as well, and caused an enlargement of the banking system. From 
1900 to 1914 several new banks operated; some of them proved to be the most valid 
and long-lived credit institutions of the country.  
These favourable developments continued in the 1920s. They were mainly driven 
by two forces: first, the sudden and rapid increase of the country’s population in 1922-
23 augmented domestic consumption and output demand, and, second, the strong 
devaluation pressures on the drachma due to high inflation, not only increased exports 
but, more importantly, reinforced speculation in the currency.
7 46 new credit 
institutions operated from 1918 to 1927. However, very few managed to survive, 
while most of them were dissolved or went bankrupt soon after the currency’s 
stabilization in 1928 and the 1929 world wide financial crisis.
8  
Main configurations of the Greek banking system were: (i) numerous small 
banks co-existed with very few large ones; (ii) they were highly leveraged and poorly 
asset-liability managed; (iii) they enjoyed monopoly rents; (iv) they were not 
regulated by an institutional principle and (v) there was no a central bank which 
would safeguard monetary and financial stability, and would act as a LLR during 
periods of crisis. 
  In particular, banks accepted private deposits and provided liquidity in the 
economy through trade discounts, commercial advances and short term lending with 
collateral (for example assets). Specialized credit institutions did not exist, which 
would provide long term, high risk loans to specific sectors of the economy, such as 
industry. Consequently, firms used to rely on short term lending to finance long term 




                                                 
7 The abnormal fluctuations of the drachma’s exchange rate during that period caused large 
discrepancies between the buying and selling prices. Speculation attacks on the currency were strong, 
frequent and excess profitable. Many banks were created to enjoy these profits.  
8 Between 1917 and 1923 17 new banks were in function; in 1924 11 new banks were created; in 1925 
8; in 1926 8 and in 1927 2. In the first months of the great crash 12 banks became bankrupt. By the end 
of 1932, the banks that remained active were reduced to 32.     17
Figure 5











1894 1901 1910 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931
demand deposits (%)* short-term lending (%)* reserves (%)**
 
Notes: all banks; * as per cent to total; ** as per cent to total assets. 
























equity to assets ratio (%) * ROE (%)**
 
 
Notes: * all banks; ** 6 large banks. LHS=equity to assets ratio, RHS=return on equity. 
Sources: banks’ Balance Sheets and Kirkilitsis (1934). 
 
  
The excess liquidity in the 1920s due to a massive money creation to cover 
wartime emergencies, caused a rapid increase in bank deposits. In the absence of a   18
developed capital market, private agents preferred to keep their money with the banks 
in the form of more liquid investments (e.g. demand deposits) so as to convert them 
readily into a gold-based foreign exchange. The 1920s were also a period of high 
domestic consumption and output demand. Banks accommodated the increase in 
output demand by expanding short term lending. As seen in Figure 5, in 1928 
discounts and advances accounted for more than 75% of total private lending; demand 
deposits were 60% of the total. At the same time, the ratio of reserves to assets was 
kept at high levels, especially in the years of high demand deposit increases. This 
implies that banks prudently used to hold vault cash to meet the demands of their 
customers for cash and payments their customers made by checks deposited in other 
banks. On the other hand, however, this also indicates that they used to keep a large 
part of their private deposits, which were a liability for the banks, in the form of 
barren money.   
The rapid increase in bank deposits which was not followed by a rise in the 
banks’ equity capital, resulted in a fall of the equity to assets ratio and an increase of 
the proportion of deposits to equity. As is evident in Figure 6, the equity to assets ratio 
had been reduced from 42% in 1894 to 20% in 1914. This downward movement 
became stronger during the inflationary period of the 1920s. From 1919 to 1928 the 
equity to assets ratio was on average 10.5%.
9 The low values of the ratio indicate that 
the banks were highly leveraged in the sense of a high ratio of deposits to equity. 
However, this is reasonable in the case of a positive, high present value of expected 
future profits. Banks usually choose a longer, on average, assets maturity in order to 
speculate on a positive yield curve and exploit funding profits. On the other hand, 
however, as the discrepancy between the maturities of assets and liabilities rises, the 
bank’s exposure to liquidity risk becomes larger and the bank more vulnerable in 
panics and sudden deposit withdrawals. In the view of a bank run, it has to decide 
upon two costly options: to sell securities at a discount or/and to borrow in the inter-
bank market at a high rate. A simple inspection of the banks’ balance sheets suggests 
that the Greek banks were poorly asset-liability managed in the sense that assets and 
liabilities seem to have the same, on average, maturity. This means that they 
                                                 
9 The equity to assets ratio is a measure of capital adequacy; it is the inverse of the equity multiplier. 
Equity multiplier is an index of capital adequacy in financial terms and not in regulatory terms. It 
measures financial leverage and represents both a profit and risk measure. Low values of the equity to 
assets ratio imply that the bank operates with less equity and more debt.    19
malfunctioned in terms of the transformation of liquidity – which is one of the most 
important banking operations – and consequently, they could not enjoy funding 
profits.  
Even though the Greek banks could not enjoy funding profits, they did enjoy, 
however, high profits as revealed by the trend behaviour of the return to equity ratio 
(ROE). As seen in Figure 6, ROE moved upwards in the first half of the 1920s. In 
1925 it was more than four times as high as it was in 1914. Banks’ profitability was 
chiefly driven by two forces: first, high profits derived from the speculation in the 
currency and, second, monopoly rents.  In particular, the market was characterized by 
an oligopolistic structure; they were a few large banks and several small ones. In the 
eve of the 1929 crash 85% of the total bank deposits were kept with 6 banks; 4 banks 
held 80% of the total equity capital. Among the larger banks, one bank, the NBG, was 
far and away the bigger. Almost half of the deposits were kept with it. Therefore, it 
exerted a monopolistic position over the market. Bank competition was extremely 
weak and in conjunction with interest inelastic demand for lending and supply of 
private deposits, the interest rate spread was high.
10  
To sum up, the development of the Greek banking system had passed through 
different phases. From the turn of the 19
th century afterwards, monetary stability and 
strong economic growth increased money transactions, bank deposits and the demand 
for money. In the 1920s the banking system expanded further. Numerous small banks 
were created. However, they were poorly asset-liability managed in terms of the 
liquidity transformation. They were also suffered by capital adequacy and were highly 
leveraged.  Leverage ratio was not used as a banks’ policy tool in order to exploit a 
mismatch in the maturities of assets and liabilities and enjoy funding profits. Instead, 
macroeconomic conditions, namely excess liquidity due to continuous money 
expansions during wartime and its aftermath, stood behind the banks’ balance sheet 
restructuring. The third phase of the development process took place in the early 
1930s. In an attempt to make banks more crisis resistant, the government made 
important institutional reforms including the foundation of a central bank and the 
initiation of a regulatory framework.   
                                                 
10 The increase in demand for goods and services caused an excess demand for money which threw a 
pressure on lending rates. The discount rate fluctuated between 7.5% and 11%. The short term lending 
rate was 15% or even higher. Whereas, the return on bank deposits was rather low: 3.5-4% on sight 
deposits, 4% on time deposits and 5% on savings.    20
5. The Country’s Financial Structure (II): the Quantity of Money  
Our concern in this section is to study the composition of money supply and to 
examine its long run behaviour. Fortunately, the compilation - for the first time - of 
long time series for the money supply in Greece and its main components gives us the 
opportunity to carry out this task.  
 
5.1 Composition  
In the case of Greece the year 1842 marks a watershed. Till then, money 
transactions were made in coins. Gold coins were minted in an extremely limited 
quantity though considerably more silver coins were produced. The Greek State’s 
later paucity of revenues made it impossible for it to continue minting coins made of 
precious metal. Gold and silver coins went rapidly out of circulation. They were either 
exported, hoarded by the public or melted down for the precious metal. Token coins 
were minted from non precious metal, such as nickel, bronzer and more often copper, 
almost every year to allow money transactions to be carried out.
11 1842 was the year 
that the NBG started its operation. The government granted to the Bank the monopoly 
of issuing and circulating banknotes which were ‘payable to the bearer upon request’ 
and readily convertible to specie. The NBG was ready to supply the public with the 
required means of payments. Its notes were accepted for private transactions; they 





                                                 
11 The Greek monetary unit was the drachma, introduced in 1833 and based on bimetallism. In order to 
adopt the LMU monetary system, the government introduced in 1882 the new drachma, equal to 1.12 
old drachmas. Unfortunately, data series for the metallic coin circulation do not exist. Quantities of 
coins minted on specific dates are only available. For a detailed discussion on the monetary history of 
Greece, see Lazaretou (2005b).  
12 The monopoly of issue was granted in exchange for the government’s participation in the bank’s 
equity and management control.    21
Figure 7






























deposits (%) banknotes (%)
 
 
Notes: private total deposits and banknotes in the hands of the public are defined as per cent to broad 
money. The data series are annual averages based on a 5 year rolling time span.  End-of-year data.   
Sources: banks’ Balance Sheets and Lazaretou (2005a).  
 
 
Figure 7 depicts the composition of the quantity of money in Greece. Two points 
are worthy of mention. First, the ratio of deposits to money stock can be considered as 
a measure of public confidence in the domestic banking system. As is evident, the use 
of banks’ deposits as a mean of payments was hardly employed in the early years of 
our time span. However, from the mid 1900s deposits displayed a strong upward 
trend. In fact, in the first years of the NBG’s operation private deposits never reached 
20% of the money supply. Ten years later, they were around 40% and remained at this 
level till the mid 1880s. In 1910, when the drachma successfully adopted the gold 
standard and public confidence had been restored, the share of deposits climbed to 
65%. During the 1920s domestic and international financial turmoil moved people to 
convert deposits into paper notes. Once the crisis had passed in the early 1930s, the 
share of deposits regained its upward trend, reaching 80% and remained at this high 
level till the end of the decade. 
  The continuous opening of the NBG’s branches in all major cities largely 
contributed to the increase of circulated banknotes and its use by the public as a mean 
of payments, especially in the country’s provinces. The degree of financial depth was 
also an important contributor factor. The enlargement of the banking system in the   22
first decade of the 20
th century could explain the increase of the share of deposits in 
the stock of money. Moreover, the higher rates of output growth during that time and 
the higher levels of per capita income, as well as the gradual urbanization of the 
country and the appearance of an urban-creditor class could also be considered as key 
determinant factors.  
Second, in the periods of currency inconvertibility crises
13  the share of deposits 
fell notably. As a matter of a low confidence in the currency, private agents decided to 
reduce their holdings of deposits, to hoard metallic coins and to use the non-
convertible paper note in their money transactions.   
 
5.2 Long run behaviour  
To analyze the long run behaviour of the money supply, we have to start with the 
mechanisms of money supply determination. Within the classical framework 
proposed by Cagan and Friedman (1956), the stock of money is jointly determined by 
the central bank, through its control of the monetary base (high-powered money); the 
public, through its preferred currency to deposit ratio; and the banks, through their 
preferred reserve holding behaviour.  
As is well known, the public has an influence on the determination of the money 
supply through its effect on the currency component. The currency-deposit ratio, that 
is, the ratio of the public’s holdings of currency to their holdings of deposits, 
represents the behaviour of the public. It is determined primarily by payment habits. 
The ratio increases when the ratio of consumption to output increases.
14 Therefore, its 
values reflect the level of integration of the country’s financial system, the level of 
urbanization and the level of per capita income. Banks also affect the determination of 
the money supply, through their influence on the deposit component. The behaviour 
of the banks is described by the reserve-deposit ratio. The bank’s choice of reserve 
ratio depends on four factors. First, on the interest forgone by holding reserves; 
second, on the cost of borrowing when the bank runs short of reserves, third, on the 
required reserve ratio; and, four, on the uncertainty of the bank’s deposit inflows and 
outflows. Thus, an increase in the market interest rate on earning assets decreases the 
                                                 
13 i.e., the late 1860s, the late 1870s, from the mid 1880s to the late 1890s and the early 1920s.  
14 Currency demand is more closely linked to consumption than output. The reverse is true for deposit 
demand.    23
reserve ratio. While an increase in the cost of running short of reserves or an increase 
in the required reserve ratio increases the reserve ratio. Similarly, the more variable 
the inflows and outflows of its deposits a bank experiences, the more reserves it 
would like to hold. Finally, the central bank’s behaviour is summarized by the stock 
of the high powered money or the monetary base.  
The interactions among the behaviour of the banks, the public and the central bank 
determine the money supply. Table 2 develops the details of the process of money 
stock determination. As seen, changes in the monetary base largely dominated the 
changes in money balances. For the whole sample period, 86.4% of the average 
growth rate of money supply was caused by the growth rate of the monetary base. 
This might be interpreted that the money supply changes closely followed the changes 
in the monetary base, while money multiplier which reflects the behaviour of the 




Table 2: Money Growth Determination, 1847-1939 (in per cent)  
















































Notes:  Columns (1) and (2) report the average annual rate of growth of the money supply (i.e. broad 
money) and the monetary base over selected dates. Columns (3) and (4) report the relative contribution 
of the monetary base and the money multiplier to the growth rate of the money supply. Monetary base 
is defined as the sum of banknotes in circulation in the hands of the public, cash and the balances of the 
commercial banknotes with the central bank. Money multiplier is the ratio of money stock to high-
powered money. The time series for money supply and monetary base are annual averages over a five 
year rolling time span.  
Sources: Own calculations based on data from banks’ Balance Sheets and Lazaretou (2005a).  
 
 
The picture, however, changes when we look at the selected sub-periods. During 
the 19
th century, the rate of growth of the money supply was almost dominated by the 
monetary base. This could be easily attributed to the long-lived inconvertible paper 
                                                 
15 This finding is close in accordance with similar findings for other less developed European countries, 
like Spain and Portugal. See, in particular, Martin-Acena (2007).    24
currency standards and the low degree of the country’s financial depth. However, in 
the first decade of the 20
th century, the relative contribution of the monetary base was 
reduced in favour of the growing impact of the banking sector and the public. Main 
contributor factors were the rapid development of the banking sector and the growing 
confidence in the domestic monetary and the banking system. The same was also true 
for the last sub-period, when the country made credible efforts to adhere to the 
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Note: The time series are annual averages based on a 5 year rolling time span.  
Source: Lazaretou (2005a) 
 
 
  Money multiplier defined as the ratio of money stock to high powered money, 
has been widely used as an index of pubic confidence in the domestic banking and 
monetary system. Money multiplier is higher the smaller the reserve-deposit ratio and 
the smaller the currency-deposit ratio. Thus, increasing values reflect public 
confidence’s promotion since a larger proportion of money balances in the hands of 
the public are kept with the banks and a smaller proportion is kept as reserves by the 
banks. Figure 8 shows its long run, or trend, behaviour in pre-WWII Greece. The ratio 
exhibited a steady increase after 1900, which was particularly striking in the years the 
country strictly adhered to the specie rule.
16 It is also striking to mention that during 
the 19
th century, money multiplier was not far from constant. Increasing values in the 
                                                 
16 i.e., 1910-1914 and 1928-1932.    25
years of currency convertibility were followed by falling values in the years of 
inflationary money.
17 This corroborates our previous finding that during this period 
























































Notes: The times series are annual averages based on a 5 year rolling time span. 
Sources: Worksheets underlying Kostelenos et al. (2007) and Lazaretou (2005a). 
 
 
Another metric of the public confidence is the income velocity of money, 
defined as the ratio of income to money and shown in Figure 9. In the very early years 
of the NBG’s operation, the rate of turnover of money was strikingly high, reflecting 
the lack of confidence of people in the new form of money, namely the NBG’s note, 
                                                 
17 i.e., 1868-70, 1877-1884, 1886-1897.   26
and the low demand for money balances. As the country was gradually being more 
financially developed, the higher demand for money in relation to income made 
velocity to fall. Velocity declined sharply reaching around 4 in the mid-1870s from 
over 50 at the starting date of our sample. In the following years, velocity continued 
its downward movement: the rate of turnover of money was half cut by 1910 and, 
with the exception of a short-lived increase during the high inflation period of the 
1920s
18, it remained at a level less than 2. 
 
Figure 10









































currency ratio reserve ratio
 
 
Notes: currency ratio=LHS, reserve ratio=RHS. The time series are annual averages based on a 5 year 
rolling time span. End-of-year data.  
Sources: banks’ Balance Sheets and Bank of Greece, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (various issues).   
 
 
The trend behaviour of the other two determinants of the money supply, 
namely the currency-deposit ratio and the reserve-deposit ratio, is depicted in Figure 
10. If we remove from the sample the exceptionally high values in the early years of 
the NBG’s operation, the currency ratio exhibited a downward movement throughout 
the 19
th century. It fluctuated between the values of 1 and 1.5, while it declined below 
1 from the turn of the century afterwards. The lower values prevailed that period, 
mirrored the progress made in the development of the domestic financial system and 
                                                 
18 Under conditions of very high and expected inflation money demand falls relative to income and, 
thus, velocity rises as people use less money in relation to income. Inflation makes money loses 
purchasing power and creates a cost of holding money balances.     27
the increased demand for deposits as a form of money. Moreover, it mirrored the 
restored confidence of people in the currency as the country consistently adhered to 
the specie rule. However, when the specie rule was abandoned in 1914, the coefficient 
rose again.  With regard to the reserve ratio, we observe the same trend behaviour, but 
it was more volatile. The fluctuations were more violent in the years of the 
inconvertibility crises, as people moved to convert deposits into banknotes. As the 
calm returned to the market, the ratio resumed its trend behaviour. Post-1900 it moved 
more strongly downwards, while it exhibited a remarkable stability.  
 
6. The Country’s Financial Structure (III): Central Banking 
6.1 Origin 
Features such as the weakness in banks’ risk management and the absence 
both of a regulatory framework and a central bank determined the specific 
institutional character of the country’s financial system. Studying these features is 
very important since the propagation of a disturbance and the probability of its turning 
into a generalized financial crisis with real ‘macro’ economy effects are influenced by 
that specific institutional character (see, in particular, Eichengreen and Portes 1987).  
  Till 1920s, Greek commercial banks, as seen in the previous section, were 
poorly asset-liability managed, highly leveraged and not institutionally supervised. 
The domestic banking system was dominated by the NBG, which acted as a 
commercial and an issue bank. Although it undertook some of the functions of a 
central bank, it was not a central bank in a strict sense. Profit motives and the priority 
to preserve monetary stability, namely, to safeguard the convertibility of its banknote, 
prohibited it from operating as a ‘banker to banks’ and a ‘lender of last resort’ in 
times of crises.  Rather, it performed as the Treasury’s bank and the sole issuer of the 
domestic banknote. Therefore, it usually appeared reluctant to take part in rescue 
operations through re-discounts so as to help commercial banks overcoming liquidity 
difficulties. Main reasons for this attitude were its profit-maximization aims and its 
rivalry with other banks. As a consequence, monetary tightness usually resulted with 
real effects and financial stability could not be preserved. Furthermore, the NBG 
could not preserve monetary and exchange rate stability either. Its commercial 
responsibilities, emanating from its acceptance of interest-bearing deposits, the tying-  28
up of its capital in long term asset investments, its exposure to business risks, its large 
involvement into high risk loans as well as its public duties as the main government 
finance provider
19 were all factors that decisively affected its flexibility and 
independence in conducting monetary policy. Specifically, it was not allowed to use 
the interest rate (i.e. the discount rate) as a monetary policy instrument. Hence, there 
was a need for the establishment of a separate issuing institution (the Bank of Greece) 
that would monitor budget deficit financing and enact policies consistent with 
exchange convertibility. In particular, the government’s stabilization effort in 1927 
was backed by a foreign loan. Foreign creditors, however, set two pre-conditions for 
lending: first, the restoration of currency convertibility as a signal of fiscal prudence 
and monetary discipline and, second, the foundation of an independent and pure 
central bank that would have the sole privilege of note issue and operate as an official 
agent in the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies, according to the new 
central banking orthodoxy.
20 Hence, the Bank of Greece was born in 1928 by the 
detachment of the NBG’s issuing department; the latter was, thus, turn into a pure 
commercial bank.  
  Another major institutional reform was made in the aftermath of the great 
crash. In 1931, for the first time, a rigorous set up concerning the structure, the 
regulation and the supervision of domestic commercial banking was initiated. 
Expectantly, the government acted according to ‘learning by crisis procedure’.
21 
Namely, it was actively involved in creating a regulatory framework that would 
insulate the banking system and the real economy from a shock. In particular, all 
commercial banks were obliged by law to keep reserves with the central bank to meet 
excess liquidity demand.
22 By the same law, banking activities were specified, a lower 
limit of equity was set to safeguard capital adequacy and banks’ exposure to business 
risk was strictly prohibited. It was defined that all banks were allowed to operate in 
the form of a limited company. Reserve-required ratio, un-doubtfully, was the most 
important institutional change since a new tool of monetary control was introduced. 
                                                 
19 Between 1920 and 1927 the government’s debt to the NBG amounted to almost 45% of its total 
assets.  
20 See, League of Nations (1927a,b).  
21 In an attempt to make the system more crisis resistant, governments always make institutional 
reforms after the occurrence of a generalized crisis. History has shown that this is a common practice 
followed after a major shock.  
22 The required reserve ratio was initially set to 7% of the total bank demand and savings deposits kept 
with the Bank of Greece and 12% of total deposits kept in the form of required reserves in their cash.    29
Through it, the central bank could control banks’ lending activities and check their 
liquidity conditions.      
 
6.2 Functions 
Maintaining the convertibility of the currency was one of the overriding objectives of 
the new central bank. As a guardian of the gold-exchange standard, the Bank of 
Greece also performed the function of a lender of last resort. However, it tried very 
hard before it was successfully established as the ‘bank to banks’ and the official body 
in the conduct of monetary and credit policies. Due to the small size and the structure 
of its portfolio, the Bank was not ready from the very beginning to perform the 
functions of a central bank. At the time of its inception, the Bank’s standing facilities 
(i.e. discounted trade bills) were 100 times as small as the trade portfolio of all 
commercial banks.
23 Hence, defending the exchange rate of the domestic currency by 
selling and buying foreign exchange at the official parity was the ultimate Bank’s 
function. The discount rate policy was also shown to be unsuccessful. The Bank 
reduced its rate in 1928, but it did not succeed to lower the market lending rate, since 
commercial banks did not face liquidity problems and the demand for money was 
high enough.  
  Things, however, changed two years later. The role and the functions of the 
Bank had developed and evolved as had the environment in which commercial banks 
operated. Specifically, the sharp decline of international demand and income caused 
agricultural exports, prices and production to fall rapidly. Industry was also adversely 
influenced. The crisis was soon transferred to commercial banking since firms could 
not repay their loans to the banks and the banks were thus attacked by severe 
withdrawals of funds by depositors.  Moreover, the collapse of the Athens Stock 
Exchange following the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange and the other 
European countries caused heavy losses in the banks’ trade portfolio since they had 
largely invested in government bonds of external debt. For the first time, commercial 
banks experiencing serious financial problems turned to the Bank asking for 
assistance. Unable to meet their liquidity requirements, they attempted to obtain 
                                                 
23 50 million drachmas compared to 5 billion drachmas.    30
support through the LLR function by borrowing from the central bank. The latter 


































Note: based on the dates of change, in per cent per annum, end-of-month data.  
Source: Bank of Greece 
 
 
  As can be seen in Figure 11 which depicts the evolution of the official 
discount rate, the Bank was quite active regarding the number of its rate changes. 
Over a 10-year period the Bank changed its rate 11 times while it remained the 
required reserve ratio nearly unchanged. Only in one year, in 1932, the Bank changed 
its rate four times. After the de-linking of the drachma from the British pound in 1931 
and the dollar in 1932, the Bank of Greece, by reducing its discount rate, managed 
successfully to lower the market lending rate and make capital cheaper, without, 
however, altering the anti-inflationary stand of the monetary policy pursued. The 
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  Table 3.1 Bank of Greece Financial Statement, 14 May 1928 
(in millions of drachmas) 
 
Assets    Liabilities   
  
Gold   876.3 Capital  400.0
Foreign exchange  
(convertible into 
gold) 
3191.1 Banknotes in 
circulation 
4863.4

















3759.5 Foreign liabilities in 
gold and foreign 
exchange 
113.2
Other 42.9 Other 30.4
  
TOTAL 7929.7 TOTAL 7929.7
Note: (*) mainly deposits held by the International Economic Committee for foreign assistance. 
Source: Bank of Greece, Annual Report of the Governor for the Year 1928, 1929.  
 
 
All operations that a typical central bank performs, that are currency issue, 
foreign exchange operations, funds investment, monetary policy operations and 
emergency liquidity assistance, affect its balance sheet. The study of the structure of 
the central bank’s balance sheet and its over time evolvement, that is the items both 
on the asset and the liquidity side,  provides useful information on monetary policy 
implementation.
24 The balance sheet can also be considered as a preliminary overview 
of central bank profitability issues and financial independence. Profitability factors are 
operating costs and the possible obligation of the central bank imposed by the 
government to engage in loss-making activities such as granting cheap credit to the 
government and bailing out banks in difficulty. Profitability is also affected by 
changes in the exchange rates and in long term interest rates. Lack of profitability is a 
key issue since profitability reflects central bank’s independence
25 and credibility. 
                                                 
24 The items in the central bank balance sheet are ordered into four categories: autonomous liquidity 
factors, open market operations, standing facilities and commercial banks’ reserves with the central 
bank. For an analysis of each category, see Bindseil (2004).  
25 Central bank independence has been defined in many different ways by central bankers themselves 
(see Mahadeva and Sterne 2000). The most commonly mentioned as important factors in the definition 
of independence are: instrument independence, the ability to formulate policy and the existence of   32
And this is because if a central bank is not independent but subordinates to the 
government, then there is a serious risk that monetary policy is not set only according 
to monetary policy needs but for economic and political reasons. 
  Hence, it is worth looking at the Bank of Greece’s balance sheet over selected 
dates, namely, in 1928, 1932 and 1939; it provides us with an insight into the key 
features of monetary policy implementation by a small developing country during 
interwar. Table 3.1 displays the balance sheet on 14 May 1928, the day that the Bank 
of Greece commenced its operations and the drachma was de jure stabilized against 
sterling in the context of the gold-exchange standard.  A number of observations can 
be made. The amounts of the gold metal and the substantial holdings of foreign 
exchange readily convertible into gold on the assets side was the outcome of the 
country’s commitment to participate in the interwar gold standard.
26 Besides foreign 
exchange, the other important asset item was government paper holdings. The claims 
against the government (47.5% of its total assets) dominated the asset side of the 
balance sheet. It seems to reveal a dependence of the Bank on the government and a 
serious risk of potential central bank losses. On the contrary, its trade portfolio was 
negligible, meaning that the Bank was at a weak position to defend its role as a ‘bank 
to banks’. On the liability side, even though commercial banks (except the NBG) were 
not subject to minimum reserves, current accounts and deposits with the central bank 
were properly distinguished among the government and the banks. From the point of 
view of monetary policy implementation, this separation is necessary in order to 
assess the degree to which reserve requirements are met. Overall, the balance sheet 
was largely dominated by net foreign assets on the asset side and note circulation on 
the liability side, implying that monetary policy strategy was focused on defending the 
official exchange rate parity. However, the dependence of the Bank on the 
government,
27 - a key feature of a developing country - might be interpreted as an 
indicator of potential financial instability and inflationary pressures.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
statutory objectives. Moreover, it is useful to distinguish between instrument independence and goal 
independence (see Mishkin 2000). Typically, a central bank will be instrument independent but not 
goal independent. This means that the government determines the macroeconomic goals that the central 
bank is called to achieve by setting the instruments of monetary policy independently.  
26 According to the Bank’s statute, no less than 40% of the banknotes in the hands of the public plus 
reserves should be converted into gold-based foreign exchange.  
27 That was due to the large involvement of the NBG in government re-financing. 
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Table 3.2 Bank of Greece Financial Statement, 31 December 1932 
(in millions of drachmas) 
 
Assets  Liabilities 
  
Gold and foreign 
exchange 
2478.1 Capital and reserves  492.8





































136.0 Foreign liabilities in 
gold and foreign 
exchange 
225.2
Claims against the 
government 
2714.1  
Other 266.9 Other 228.1
  
TOTAL 9111.2 TOTAL 9111.2
Note: (*) in drachmas and foreign exchange 
Source: Bank of Greece, Annual Report of the Governor for the Year 1932 (1933).  
 
 
  Table 3.2 displays the Bank’s financial statement at the end of 1932 when 
major institutional changes took place which were the government’s response to the 
aftermath of the severe economic and financial crisis of 1929. A careful look at the 
Bank’s balance sheet can provide information on whether and how these changes 
might influence monetary policy implementation. Some important conclusions can be 
derived. First, even though the domestic currency was de-linked from gold, the Greek 
monetary authorities continued to keep a high ratio of note circulation backed to gold 
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Table 3.3 Bank of Greece Financial Statement, 31 December 1939 
(in millions of drachmas) 
 
Assets  Liabilities  
  
Gold and foreign 
exchange 
4346.1 Capital and reserves  626.7





































509.7 Foreign liabilities in 
gold and foreign 
exchange 
538.4
Claims against the 
government 
4084.1  
Other 824.8 Other  1242.8
  
TOTAL 23405.8 TOTAL 23405.8
Note: (*) in drachmas and foreign exchange. 
Source: Bank of Greece, Annual Report of the Governor for the Year 1939 (1940).  
 
 
Second and, more importantly, monetary policy operations were not now 
negligible. The central bank via standing facilities managed to influence the demand 
for and the supply of banks’ reserves and to support its role as a banks’ bank. 
Discounted trade bills, advances, current accounts and collaterized credit
28 had all 
considerably increased. Third, claims on the government had substantially been 
reduced to 29.8% of its total assets, implying moderate involvement of the Bank in 
government financing and a higher degree of independence. Last but not least, on the 
liability side, deposits held by the banking system with the central bank had massively 
increased from the previous year (86.2%), as the result of the new institutional 
framework. Hence, reserve requirements supplied the Bank with a new and very 
                                                 
28 Credit to commercial banks, the government and private agents. Contrary to the standard functions of 
a central bank, the Bank of Greece used to provide short term lending facilities not only to the banks 
but directly to the private sector. This was because commercial banks experiencing serious financial 
problems were unable to meet the demand for money.    35
important instrument for monetary control. All in all, however, the Bank’s balance 
sheet can be considered far from being ‘lean’
29 and the Bank being deeply 
concentrated on monetary policy implementation. Even though monetary base 
dominates on the liability side, monetary policy operations do not do so on the asset 
side. Government debt and foreign exchange reserves are of a similar order of 
magnitude with monetary policy operations. 
Looking next at the Bank’s balance sheet in the end of 1939, when the western 
European countries had already gone to war, some interesting observations can also 
be made. First, regarding the monetary policy strategy, it appears that the Bank of 
Greece continued to focus on defending the exchange rate of the drachma even though 
the international monetary relations had changed towards floating rates and the central 
banks had abandoned the goal of preserving exchange rate stability. The balance sheet 
is largely dominated by foreign exchange and mainly gold reserves on the asset side 
and banknotes in circulation on the liability side. Even though the statutory limit of 
40% of note circulation convertible into foreign exchange was not any more in effect, 
a per cent near this lower bound limit was backed by gold. And this was because the 
central bank continued to excessively focus on the chosen monetary policy framework 
of a currency peg against sterling.
30 Second, the balance sheet reveals that the Bank 
remained dependent on the government and, third, regarding the monetary policy 
implementation framework, the Bank had chosen to administer the amount of credit-
money created by the commercial banks via standing facilities – consisted either of a 
discount and an advance facility – and imposing reserve requirements. In view of the 
widespread panic withdrawal followed the start of hostilities in Europe, the Bank 
reacted by lowering the reserve holdings by the banks with it and providing liquidity 
mainly through advances and current accounts.




                                                 
29 In a perfectly ‘lean’ central bank balance sheet, the liability side consists only of the monetary base 
while the asset side displays only monetary policy operations (see Bindseil 2004, ch.2).  
30 In April 1932 the government devalued the drachma and abandoned the gold-exchange standard. 
However, it appeared unable to abandon the gold shelter. In 1933 the country joined the Gold Bloc and 
the drachma was pegged against the Swiss franc. After its dissolution in September 1936, the drachma 
joined the ‘Sterling Area’. Until the eve of WWII it remained fixed against sterling.  
31 Banks’ deposits with the central bank were reduced by 54% in December 1939 over the same period 
the previous year, while credit increased by 35%.    36
7. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this paper was to trace – for the first time - the historical 
evolution of central banking in pre-WWII Greece. To this end, the country’s process 
of financial development was presented. Two structures that determined the specific 
institutional character of the domestic financial system, namely the quantity of money 
and central banking, were detailed. In particular, several indices of financial depth 
were assessed and their evolvement was studied. The composition of the money 
supply and its long run behaviour was also analysed. Central banking was viewed 
with respect to the monetary policy strategy, the monetary policy implementation 
framework and dependence on the government. All factors were closely determined 
by the structure of the central bank’s balance sheet.  
  The paper’s main conclusions have as follows. The country’s financial 
development had passed through different stages. Throughout the 19
th century, the 
process of financial intermediation went at a slow pace. Many banks were created but 
very few eventually operated. One bank, the NBG, created in 1842 and functioned as 
a ‘universal’ and an issue bank, soon became the biggest in resources and exerted its 
dominance over the domestic money market. From the turn of the century afterwards, 
monetary stability and rapid economic growth increased money transactions, bank 
deposits and the demand for money. In the 1920s the banking system expanded 
further. However, on the basis of the evaluated behavioural indices, banks were 
shown to be poorly asset-liability managed. This means that they malfunctioned in 
terms of the liquidity transformation and they could not enjoy funding profits. They 
were also suffered by capital adequacy and were highly leveraged. It seemed that 
excess liquidity due to continuous money expansions stood behind the banks’ balance 
sheet restructuring.  
  Concerning the quantity of money, the trend behaviour of its main 
determinants (i.e. the monetary base, the currency-deposit ratio and the reserve-
deposit ratio) was studied. Two metrics of the public confidence in the banking 
system, namely the money multiplier and the income velocity of money were also 
assessed. It was found that the money supply changes closely followed the changes in 
monetary base, while money multiplier which reflects the behaviour of the people and 
the banks, had a minimum impact. This finding demonstrates that money creation 
primarily determined the money stock. It was also found that during the periods of   37
currency convertibility, public confidence in the domestic banking system was 
promoted, as measured by money multiplier and velocity.    
  Key inefficiencies of the country’s financial system were the absence both of a 
central bank and a regulatory framework for the supervision of commercial banking 
activities. The major institutional reforms that took place in the last decade of the 
interwar period altered the operation of the domestic banking system and changed the 
character of monetary policy implementation. The first reform concerned the founding 
of a pure and ‘real’ central bank and the second one was related to the initiation of a 
rigorous set up with clear cut rules over the banking system.  
  A look at the structure of the central bank’s balance sheet revealed that 
throughout the period under study the Bank of Greece appeared to be excessively 
focused on the chosen monetary policy strategy of a currency peg. Monetary policy 
operations mainly included liquidity-providing standing facilities, conducted at the 
initiative of the banks and were consisted either of discounts and advances. In the 
course of a ten year period (1928-1939) the Bank of Greece had successfully 
controlled over the domestic money market via its discount rate policy and supported 
its role as a ‘banks’ bank’. However, its considerable involvement in government re-
financing might indicate its low independence on political pressures.  
Two caveats are in order. First, a comparative study taking into account the 
experience of other European developing countries might be included in the paper’s 
analysis. This should be useful for our better understanding of the history of the 
monetary policy implementation and the evolution of the financial development 
process in other less-known European countries. Second, useful conclusions would 
also be drawn by a thorough examination of the episodes of financial crises in pre-
WWII Greece with respect to the timing of action, the role of the government in 
handling these crises and the central bank’s motives. Both issues would be very 
interesting questions for further suggestive and empirical research.  
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